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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
NEALY W. ADAMS,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Case No. 20070381-CA

v,
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee,
ARGUMENT
I.

DUE TO THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF HIS FORMER
COUNSEL, ADAMS WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO
CHOOSE FOR HIMSELF THE BEST DEFENSE TO ASSERT
IN THIS CASE

One of the critical issues in this appeal is whether
Adams had the right to be apprised of the defense of
voluntary intoxication.

The State's appellee brief lightly

glosses over this issue, attempting to create the appearance
that Adams had only one viable defense to present at trial:
the so-called UI didn't do it" defense.

The State is wrong.

From the very outset of this case, several other viable
defenses were clearly available to Adams.

Chief amongst

those options was the possibility of asserting a diminished
capacity defense based on voluntary intoxication.1
^Another viable option would have
more than simply put the State to its
requiring the State to prove each and
case beyond a reasonable doubt. This

Yet

been to do nothing
burden of proof,
every element of its
defense is often

Adams was never apprised of the possibility of asserting
this defense, because of the deficiencies of his former
counsel.

The failure by such counsel to adequately

recognize and apprise him of his defense options was
objectively unreasonable, falling far below applicable
standards of competent advocacy.

See, e.g., Adams v. State,

2005 UT 62, 123 P.3d 400, 406 (u[C]ounsel should at least
apprise the client of the options available and give advice
based on research, experience, and sound judgment."
(emphasis added)).

Frankly, such failure by Adams' former

counsel amounts to gross negligence.
It cannot be disputed in this case that Adams was never
timely apprised of the right to assert a defense of
voluntary intoxication, either by his trial counsel or by
his appellate counsel.

The first notice that Adams ever had

of the right to assert such a defense came six years after
his conviction had been entered, well after his direct
appeal remedies had been exhausted.

Such was Adams'

uncontroverted testimony at the post-conviction evidentiary
hearing herein, to wit:
U

Q. Mr. Adams, when did you first learn [of a]

invoked with good results.
2

potential (inaudible) diminished capacity [defense] by
virtue of voluntary intoxication?

When did you first find

that out?
"A. When I first retained the firm of Morrison and
Morrison, approximately - I saw the draft brief
approximately, oh gosh, October of 2002.

That's roughly the

time frame.
U

Q. How many years after you were convicted?

U

A. That would have been six years, a little over six

years.
U

Q.

Prior to that time you'd never been informed that

there was that possibility?
"A. Never."
R. at 765 (evidentiary Hearing transcripts at 17-18).
Adams could not choose for himself what defense to
assert in this case, because his former counsel never told
him of his available options.

It was his trial attorney's

job to tell him what his options were before trial, and it
was his appellate attorney's job to tell him what his
options were on appeal, yet neither attorney ever fulfilled
this critical responsibility.

Neither one ever disclosed to

Adams the option of asserting a defense of voluntary

3

intoxication.

Hence, when Adams went to trial, he went with

the only defense that had been presented to him, which was
not his best defense.

And when he pursued his direct appeal

remedies, he went with the only defense that was presented
to him, which was not his best defense on appeal.

The net

effect was the entry of a conviction against him that was
ultimately affirmed on appeal, much to Adams' great harm and
prejudice.
Certainly, the post-conviction court was very concerned
with whether Adams had ever been apprised of the defense of
voluntary intoxication, prior to seeking post-conviction
relief-

At the evidentiary hearing below, the post-

conviction court asked pointed questions to get at a proper
determination of this issue.

For example, the court asked

expert witness John Caine this question:
U

THE COURT:

And I assume then under your ethical

responsibilities you are to point out the possible defenses
that are available?
"THE WITNESS:

Absolutely."

R. at 765 (evidentiary Hearing transcripts at 62.)
And the post-conviction court asked counsel during
closing argument about their respective positions regarding

4

the matter.

(See R. at 765, evidentiary hearing transcripts

at 109-112 and 118-20.)

After considering all of the

evidence in the case, as well as the arguments of counsel,
the post-conviction court was left with no choice but to
find that Adams had not been apprised of the right to assert
a defense of voluntary intoxication by his former counsel.
(See, e.g., Finding of Fact #21.)

Yet despite reaching that

finding, the post-conviction court shockingly concluded that
Adams had not been deprived of effective assistance of
counsel.

It is this conclusion that is erroneous as a

matter of law and must be overturned.
As pointed out in our opening brief, it is the client
who is the ultimate decisionmaker in any criminal
proceeding, not his attorney.

In the instant case, it was

Adams who had to make the ultimate decision about what
direction his defense would go, not his trial attorney and
not his appellate attorney.

Despite this being settled Utah

law (see, e.g., Adams, 123 P.3d at 406; State v. Wood, 648
P.2d 71, 92 (Utah 1982)), the State wrongfully argued before
the post-conviction court that it was defense counsel's job
to make the ultimate decisions in the case, not Adams.
example, counsel for the State argued as follows during

5

For

closing argument:
Now I think that maybe you could say counsel
does have the responsibility to cover all
possible defenses with their client but the
ultimate decision of what is to be presented to
the jury is not the client's decision, it is
counsel's decision because counsel is the one
that's on the hook for that decision just like
we've seen today... It's defense counsel's
ultimate responsibility after consulting with
his client to decide what defense to raise and
in this case [trial counsel] made a reasonable
tactical decision to assert the defense that he
asserted.
R. at 765 (evidentiary hearing transcripts at 120 (emphasis
added) ) .
The State's erroneous arguments aside, the key point is
that Adams was the ultimate decisionmaker in this case, and
that he was prevented from making the ultimate decisions on
his own behalf, because he had not been adequately presented
with his options, due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Hence, Adams' constitutionally protected right to a fair
trial, and his constitutionally protected right to receive
competent and effective assistance of counsel throughout the
entirety of the underlying criminal proceedings, have been
undermined and violated in this case.

As a result, Adams is

entitled to appropriate post-conviction relief.
Accordingly, this Court should forthwith set aside his

6

conviction, and remand, the matter for a new trial .

xx.

THE ORIGINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE REPLETE
WITH EVIDENCE OF ADAMS' CHRONIC ftI.COHOLISM
AND DIMINISHED CAPACITY

^ ^

r-p-tion

iri

this case b u t

that A d a m s ' p r o b l e m w i \ h d i cc.:o: w a s going to b e o n
prominent

..3^^.

r.f.eed,

s\ .

the trial transcripts of the original tri^l proceedings ire
p i ui > 1« i iu w i I 11

replete with references to Adams' cluun i
alcoholism

• .

Below Is a chart outlining the many i nstances that
cij,.:.

:

cis its profoundly

deleterious effect: or: Adams' mental capacity 3s noted by the
attorneys and witnesses

..-io^.:

ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART
.STY NAME:
1 Les Daroczi
j prosecutor

!

STATEMENT/TESTIMONY:

REFERENCE:

"It was in April that -- Virla
Hess will tell you that it was
in April that the relationship
seemed to be worsening. She
thought the defendant was
drinking more."

T.T., vol
, , a.

!

7

„ —,

1

1

ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART

Les Daroczi
(prosecutor)

"And, also, there was an
incident with a -- with Virla
being awakened by the sound of
breaking glass, and when she
woke up to see what it was, the
defendant was coming out of
Carleen's room and was
intoxicated and -- and didn't
have pants on."

||
T.T., vol.
I, at 16
[R. at 074]

XX

Virla Hess
(witness)

T.T., vol.
Q. All right. Was there a
I, at 46
time that you -- some time this
year in x95 that you and the
[R. at 074]
defendant begin to -- you begin
to have a more stormy
relationship?
"A. Around December he started I
drinking real heavy and -"Q. You are talking about this
year?
"A. Yes.
U
Q. Okay.
"A. And he was --he just
wasn't hisself (sic)."

Virla Hess
(witness)

"He'd just sit there and drink.
Sometimes he'd -- I'd have to
help him into the bed."

T.T., vol.
I, at 47
[R. at 074]

Virla Hess
(witness)

U

T.T., vol.
1/ at 48

Virla Hess
(witness)

A. And when Wayne came in that
night, why, he'd been drinking
and he was real ignorant, and
he just wasn't hisself (sic)."
U
Q.
U

Okay. So what happened?
A. Nothing really that night,
other than he drank -"Q. Okay.
n
A. -- all night long. He was
really drunk when he went to
bed."

8

[R. at 074]
T.T., vol.
I, at 48-49
[R. at 074]

ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART
Virla Hess
(witness)

Virla Hess
(witness)

Virla Hess
(witness)

U

A. ... And we more or less
argued until I went to bed. He
was drunk. He just kept
drinking. And it was my
understanding that when I went
to work Monday, which was the
24th, that when I come home
from work at three o'clock :
Monday, he was going to be
gone. But when I got home, he
was laying on the couch
sleeping off a drunk."

Vk

Q. Was there a time that there
was -- you were awakened prior
to the breaking up by the sour
of glass breaking?
"A. Yes.
Q.

Tell

L;„;L

-12 j

a L Jilt

Ll'ld I .

U

A. It was -- it was on a
;;urday night. Wayne had bei I i inking really heavy.
"

.irla Hess
(witness)

[R. at 0 74]

XX
A. So I left him alone and
then when he woke up, I asked
him what -- what he was going
t : • do. And he says: What do
yc "a. mean? And he starts in
drinking again
• '•

V

Virla Hess
vwitness)

vol.
T.T
I at 51

"Q. Oka;
A. I go .:: < the bathroom an
I ask himi What's going on?
"Q. And he's sitting there on
the toilet. Well, where, am I
What am I doing? I finally g:
hirr --*-- h^i."
U

"Q. Now, isn't it correct thai
you and Wayne had been -Wayne, you indicated, was not
happy?
"A. That's what he'd sa, '-lit-n
he was drunk, yes.
"Q. And he'd -- he'd starting
drinking a lot, lot more as
time went on after December, i.
that correct?
"A. Yes."

9

at 55

1

ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART

Virla Hess
(witness)

Virla Hess
(witness)

Virla Hess
(witness)

Virla Hess
(witness)

"Q. Okay. Would you start with
that paragraph and read it on
down to where the -- through
the yellow underlining?
"A. x 0n the 22nd of April,
Wayne had been gone all day and
when he came home, he was
pretty much drunk. And he
said, what are you going to do
if I leave? And I told him
nobody was keeping him there,
the door -- there was the door,
to leave. He just kept on all
night.'"

||
T.T., vol.
I, at 61
[R. at 074]

U
Q. Isn't it correct Carleen
will tell you -- well, let me - that's -- during this period,
Wayne was drinking quite
heavily?
M
A. Yes, he was.
"Q. To the point of, as you
indicated on this night, not
really understanding where he
was or what he was doing?
X
\A. He done that quite a bit.
He'd sit there and drink until
he didn't know who he was,
where he was. I came home one
night to pick up my car after
he had it. He was sitting
behind the chair in a fetal
position. He doesn't know
where he is, who he is."

T.T., vol.
I, at 102
[R. at 074]

U
Q. And that's kind of how he
appeared that night?
"A. He was drunk.
U
Q. Okay. He was drunk when
you went to bed and -"A. Yes -AX
Q. -- still drinking?
U
A. -- and he was still
drinking when I went to bed."

T.T., vol.
I, at 102

"A. I didn't know what was
going on. I asked Wayne and he
told me he didn't even know
where he was. Right to this
day, I don't know what went
on."

T.T., vol.
I, at 104

[R. at 074]

[R. at 074]

J
10

H

I

ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART
U

A. Carleen wouldn't say
anything. Not that night, no.
Carleen would not say anything.
She just threw his shirt out
and said it was his shirt. And
I know Wayne came out of the
bedroom, went in and sat on the
toilet. The pants were on the
floor and he was absolutely
naked. But he was drunk, too.
"Q. Yes, he was drunk.
U
A. Yeah, he was."

Virla Hess
(witness)

U

Virla Hess
(witness)

Virla Hess
(witness)

Nealy W. Adams
(defendant)

'

A. He had been drinking, yes."

XX

||
T.T., vol.
I, at 105
[R. at 074]

T.T., vol.
II, at 34
[R. at 074]

Q. Okay. He was there when
you got home on the 24th; is
that correct?
"A. Yes, he was asleep on the
couch, sleeping off a drunk."

T.T., vol.
II, at 36

"Q. When did you first meet
Virla Hess.
U
A. Approximately the latter
part of August of 1993.
U
Q. And where did you meet her
at?
"A. The American Legion Post

T.T., vol.
Ill, at 6-7

[R. at 074]

[R. at 074]

XV

Q. Were you drinking then?
A. Yes, I was.
U
Q. Was she drinking?
"A. Yes, she was.
U
Q. She knew you drank
regularly?
U
A. Yes, she did."
U

Nealy W. Adams
(defendant)

U

Q. The incident that has been
testified to concerning the
breaking of the clock, had you
been drinking that night?
"A. Yes, I had.
U
Q. Do you recall the incident
at all?
U
A. No, I do not."

11

T.T., vol.
Ill, at 15
[R. at 074]

1

ALCOHOL REFERENCE CHART

Nealy W. Adams
(defendant)

Nealy W. Adams
(defendant)

"Q. (By Mr. Daroczi) Were there
times when -- when after -after drinking you would the
next day not recall what
happened after -- what happened
while you had been under the
influence of alcohol?
"A. There was some times, yes.
"Q. Okay. Just like -- like
the incident you recall about
the clock being broken and you
coming out of her room? You
don't dispute that that
happened?
U
A. I dispute remembering it."

||
T.T., vol.
Ill, at 18
[R. at 074]

U
Q. Okay. Because there were
T.T., vol.
times when -- other times when
Ill, at 18
you had been drinking and not
remember what you had done
[R. at 074]
! after -- under the influence of
alcohol; is that correct?
U
A. I could remember Virla
helping me into the --to bed.
U
Q. Well, no. no. I'm -- yes,
and we've covered that. And
like you said, there were other
incidents where you wouldn't
remember what you had done
under the influence of alcohol
the next day.
U
A. There were some times."

J

1

Again, the question must be asked: should Adams' trial
counsel have foreseen how prominent the alcohol issue was
going to be at trial?

Of course he should have.

obligation to foresee this.

It was his

He was on notice that it was

going to be featured as a prominent part of the case.

From

the discovery in this case, he was on notice that it was
going to play a large role at trial.
12

It was prominently

featured in the two preliminary hearings conducted in this
matter, and it was prominently featured in the police
reports and discovery material that was on file and made
available to counsel.

(See R. at 765, evidentiary hearing

transcripts at 30-31; see also R. at 074, Trial Transcripts,
vol. I, at 61.)
Moreover, trial counsel was fully aware of Adams'
alcohol tendencies, as counsel was a recovering alcoholic
himself, and Adams often smelled of alcohol when the two met
to prepare the case in advance of trial.

(R. at 7 65,

evidentiary hearing transcripts at 12-13, 2 0.) At a
minimum, Adams' smell of alcohol should have been a major
signal to trial counsel that his client had a chronic
alcohol problem, which could have been utilized
advantageously by asserting it as an affirmative defense.
As it turned out, Adams' chronic alcohol problem was
not only a featured aspect at trial, but it was also a
featured aspect of Adams' appeal.

Indeed, the two appellate

court opinions issued as part of Adams' direct appeal make
multiple references to Adams' chronic alcohol problem.

See,

e.g., State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781, 782-83 (Utah Ct. App.
1998); State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 642, 644 (Utah 2000).

13

Yet

unfortunately for Adams, this issue was neither discussed
nor portrayed in a light that would have been positively
helpful to him, in terms of considering it as a potential
defense.

Instead, it was presented in a starkly negative

light, with Adams being painted as a bumbling drunk who
probably deserved to be convicted of some violation of the
penal code.
Suffice it to say that Adams' severe alcohol problem
(marked by major episodes of binge drinking, blackouts, and
complete memory loss) was a key part of the criminal
proceedings below, both before, during, and after Adams'
trial.

Regrettably, Adams' former counsel failed to

appreciate its significance, and failed to ever timely
assert it as a defense.

As a result, Adams had a conviction

entered against him that was the direct and proximate result
of ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of his
state and federal constitutional rights.

Inasmuch as Adams

did not receive effective assistance of counsel in the
underlying proceedings below, his conviction cannot stand,
and must now be set aside.

This Court should not

countenance any further deprivation of Adams' constitutional
rights.

Instead, it should forthwith reverse the post-

14

conviction court's decision, and remand this matter for a
new trial.

III.

A VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION DEFENSE WAS NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH AN "I DIDN'T DO IT" DEFENSE

Another important question in this appeal is this:
could Adams have relied on both an U I didn't do it" defense,
as well as a voluntary intoxication defense at trial?
Absolutely.

He could have relied on both of these defenses

below, without any inconsistency in his position.

The

option was certainly available to him to invoke an U I didn't
do it" defense in response to the rape count, while
simultaneously relying on a voluntary intoxication defense
in response to the forcible sexual abuse count.

There would

have been no inconsistency in this approach, provided that
his trial counsel competently performed his professional
duties in this case by timely asserting the defense, by
retaining an expert witness to adequately support it, and by
carefully preparing Adams' testimony at trial, in the event
Adams needed to testify.

(R. at 7 65, evidentiary hearing

transcripts at 50-53, 55, 59-61.)
In terms of contesting the rape count, trial counsel
frankly did not have an overly difficult task.
15

Admittedly,

this count was the more serious of the two counts that were
pending against Adams, yet it was also considerably weaker
in terms of evidentiary support.

Indeed, reasonable doubt

was everywhere to be found in challenging the rape count, as
even the State's own medical expert in the case concluded
that Carleen Hess--the accuser herein--was virginal in her
sexual make up, finding no evidence of intercourse and no
evidence of any kind of physical or sexual abuse.
074 (T.T., vol. II, at 5-7),)

(R. at

Moreover, Carleen's own

testimony was, while no doubt sympathetic, not overly strong
and at times extremely difficult to follow.

Such testimony

proved to be ambiguous, contradictory, vague, and
inconsistent.

Again, it should not be forgotten that such

testimony was improperly bolstered by other witnesses at
trial, as noted by both this Court and the Utah Supreme
Court on direct appeal.

Adams, 955 P.2d at 786; Adams, 5

P.3d at 647-48.
All things considered, there was only a remote
likelihood that Adams would be convicted of the rape count
at trial, and he was in fact rightfully acquitted of it.
Unfortunately, his trial attorney failed to give the jury an
opportunity to consider Adams' best defense to the forcible

16

sexual abuse count, i.e., the defense of voluntary
intoxication.

Indeed, trial counsel gave the jury almost

nothing to consider in terms of defeating this count.

It

should come as no surprise, then, that Adams was convicted
of this charge, due in large part to grossly ineffective
advocacy by his trial counsel.
The essential point is that Adams very well could have
relied on a voluntary intoxication defense at trial,
interposing it as a defense to the sexual abuse count, while
simultaneously relying on an UI didn't do it" defense with
respect to the rape count.
defenses.

These were not inconsistent

The only problem is that his trial counsel failed

to competently appreciate the viability of utilizing a
voluntary intoxication defense.

This blatant mistake was

unfortunately repeated on appeal, much to Adams' great
detriment.
In short, Adams could have (and, according to defense
expert John Caine, should

have)

legitimately invoked a

voluntary intoxication defense in this case, but he was
prevented from doing so because he was never even told of
the right to invoke it.

Because Adams' former counsel

failed to competently apprise Adams of his available defense

17

options in this case, Adams has received grossly ineffective
of counsel.

The proper remedy is to afford Adams a new

trial, in order to ensure a fair and just outcome in this
case, and to ensure that Adams' constitutional right to
receive effective assistance of counsel is upheld.

See

State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321 (Utah 2007) (vacating
defendant's conviction and awarding new trial where
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel); State
v. Thomas, 743 P.2d 816 (Wash. 1987) (same); State v.
Tilton, 72 P.3d 735 (Wash. 2003).

IV. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE WERE MULTIPLE
INSTANCES OF ABUSE IS ERRONEOUS
The State continues to argue in this case that there
were multiple instances of abuse, not a single episode.
Hence, the argument goes, Adams would not have been able to
invoke a voluntary intoxication defense at trial without
showing that he was intoxicated on each of the alleged
"multiple" instances of abuse.

The State's position is

untenable.
At trial, the State did not establish multiple
instances of abuse.

Again, it must be kept in mind that

only a single count of forcible sexual was charged in the
18

information (not multiple counts), and only a single count
was set forth in the jury instructions.

Simply put, the

State's argument that there were multiple instances of abuse
is a red herring.

Since this issue has already been

adequately covered in Adams' appellant brief (see Brief at
41-44), it need not be further addressed herein.

V.

THE POST-CONVICTION COURT'S DECISION TO OVERRULE
ADAMS7 WELL-TAKEN OBJECTIONS TO THE STATE'S
PROPOSED ORDER SHOWS THAT THE COURT MECHANICALLY
ADOPTED THAT ORDER, SURRENDERING AN IMPORTANT
JUDICIAL FUNCTION TO ADAMS' OPPONENT

Finally, it is necessary to revisit the issue of the
post-conviction court's decision to adopt the State's
proposed Order without revision.

With all due respect to

the post-conviction court, surely one of many objections
that Adams raised in opposition to the State's proposed
Order had merit.

If indeed only one objection had merit,

then at a minimum the post-conviction court should have
sustained that objection, rather than completely overruling
the entirety of Adams' objections.
By overruling all of Adams' objections, and by entering
the State's proposed order without revision, the postconviction court clearly gave the impression to Adams that

19

it was uninterested in hearing from him, and that it was
simply going to adopt his opponent's order notwithstanding
any valid objection to the same.

In other words, the post-

conviction court clearly gave Adams' the impression that it
was mechanically adopting the State's proposed order,
thereby surrendering an important judicial role to Adams'
opponent.
There is good reason why Utah law adheres to the
longstanding policy of disapproving a trial court's
mechanical adoption of a party's proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order.
567 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Utah 1977).

See Boyer Co. v. Lignell,
Underpinning that policy

is the need for courts to independently reach their own
rationale and analysis for resolving the issues in
controversy.

For a trial court to turn over this important

task to one of the litigants in a case is to surrender a
nondelegable core judicial function.
The State is treating this issue as unimportant.
not unimportant.

It is

Adams' objections to the State's proposed

order were well-taken, and should not have been summarily
overruled.

To the extent that this Court determines that

the post-conviction court mechanically adopted the State's
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proposed order without proper cause, then Adams is entitled
to appropriate relief, such as the entry of an order that
accurately reflects the post-conviction court's own
independent analysis and conclusions, not the analysis and
conclusions advocated by the State.

CONCLUSION;
Adams has now spent more than 12 years serving a
sentence on a conviction that quite likely would not have
been entered against him had his former counsel adequately
fulfilled their duties and responsibilities in this case by
rendering effective assistance of counsel.

It was below an

objective standard of reasonableness for Adams' former
counsel to fail to appreciate the significance of Adams'
chronic alcohol problem.

It was below an objective standard

of reasonableness for Adams' former counsel to fail to
appreciate the significance of utilizing a voluntary
intoxication defense at trial and on appeal. And it was way
below an objective standard of reasonableness for Adams'
former counsel to fail to ever apprise Adams of his right to
rely upon a defense of voluntary intoxication.

All of these

deficiencies combined must inexorably lead to the conclusion
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that Adams has been deprived of effective assistance of
counsel.
Justice now demands that Adams' wrongful conviction be
set aside.

This Court should vacate the conviction, and in

so doing afford Adams a new trial, wherein his
constitutional right to receive effective assistance of
counsel is recognized, protected, and upheld-

In the

interest of justice, this Court should therefore reverse the
decision of the post-conviction court, set aside Adams'
conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 1^ ***

DAY OF MAY, 2008.
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Attorneys for Appellant
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